(1975), for instance, sifts through a variety of trickster definitions in an attempt to find the "best" (she ends up favoring Turner's view of the trickster as a liminal figure). Beidelman (1980) , on the other hand, takes very much the opposite position, arguing that we should abandon any attempt to develop a cross-culturally valid definition of the trickster, and instead focus upon specific mythic figures in specific cultures. My own position falls somewhere in between. Very simply, I suggest that investigators should reduce the generality of the trickster label by recognizing that this label subsumes several distinct character types (e.g., the clever hero, the selfish-buffoonwho-is-a-culture-hero, etc.). Unlike Beidelman, however, I am convinced that each of these more specific trickster categories can prove useful in the analysis of myths from different cultures.
In any event, what I focus on in this article are tricksters of the selfish-buffoon/culture hero variety, and unless otherwise specified, the term trickster will henceforth refer only to this character type.
NORTH AMERICAN TRICKSTERS
There are literally dozens of tricksters who appear in the myths of the North American Indian tribes. Amerindian scholars, however, have tended to group these tricksters into seven distinct categories, on the grounds that all the tricksters within each category are simply different manifestations of the same mythic character, who has spread to different tribes through a process of cultural diffusion. In other words, it is conventional to talk of seven distinct tricksters in North American mythology.
Perhaps the most well-known of these seven tricksters is the one called "Coyote" by a variety of tribes west of the Mississippi. Apart from Coyote, other well-known tricksters include the character called "Nanabush" by several Algonkian speaking tribes of the Northeast, the character called "Raven" by several tribes in the Pacific Northwest, and the character called "Rabbit" by several of the southeastern tribes. Less well-known, perhaps, are the tricksters who appear in Siouan mythology. A number of investigators (see, e.g., Dorsey 1892; Radin 1972 Radin [1956 :124-146) have made the point that most Siouan tribes tend to have two separate tricksters, each of whom acts the role of selfish-buffoon/culture hero. One of these two tricksters is invariably called "Hare" while the other is called "Iktomi" by the Dakota Sioux, "Wakdjunkaga" by the Winnebago, "Ishtinike" by the Ponca and the Omaha, and "Inktonmi" by the Assiniboine. The seventh and final Amerindian trickster, or more precisely, trickster category, includes the various tricksters who appear in the myths of the Algonkian speaking tribes of the western Plains, that is, the character called "Napi" by the Blackfoot, "Nihanca" by the Arapaho, "Wihio" by the Cheyenne, and "Nihaat" by the Gros Ventres. Table 1 presents a list of these seven trickster categories and gives (in column 2) some of the variant names associated with each. This table also gives (in column 3) some of the tribes in which these tricksters appear as both culture heroes and selfish-buffoons; the references in parentheses are to sources which contain a fairly substantial collection of trickster myths for the tribe being considered.
Rabbit
Hare or Rabbit hare hare All of the tricksters listed in Table 1 are portrayed as having a number of human qualities. On the other hand, it is nevertheless true that most of these tricksters are also associated with some particular category of animal. This association is typically established either by virtue of the name given to the trickster or by attributing to the trickster certain animal traits. It turns out that there are only four animal categories that end up being associated with our seven basic tricksters. These four are coyote, raven, hare, and spider. The particular animal category associated with each trickster is given in the final column of Table 1. Presumably, the basis for arguing that Coyote is associated with the coyote, that Hare is associated with the hare, and that Raven is associated with the raven, is obvious. For the linguistic and textual evidence in support of the contention that both Nanabush and Rabbit are associated with the hare category, see Carroll (1981: 307-309) and Levi-Strauss (1978 These seven basic tricksters, either singly or collectively, have been the subject of many investigations over the past century, and almost all investigators have felt compelled to address the very juxtaposition that makes these characters so distinctive: Why should a major culture hero simultaneously be portrayed as a selfish-buffoon? One of the first explanations offered for this unlikely juxtaposition of elements was offered by Brinton (1896:194) , who advanced what might be called the "degradation hypothesis." Very simply, Brinton's argument is that the trickster started out as a "pure" culture hero, but that over time he became debased and acquired his selfish-buffoon elements. Brinton offered no evidence in support of this hypothesis, and it has generally fallen from favor with Amerindian scholars. Boas (1898) offered an explanation of the trickster that is in some ways the reverse of Brinton's degradation argument. Boas argued that making a culture hero simultaneously a selfish-buffoon solves a conceptual difficulty likely to be experienced by the members of less advanced societies. It is Boas's contention that a sense of altruism is not likely to be very well developed in simpler societies, and so the members of such societies would find it difficult to understand why a culture hero would want to benefit mankind. The problem of motivation is solved, however, if the "benefits to mankind" are the accidental by-products of actions which the culture hero undertakes for purely selfish reasons. With the advance of civilization, a sense of altruism becomes more likely, and so altruistic behavior on the part of a culture hero becomes more understandable. The fact that the conceptual need to make a culture hero simultaneously a selfishbuffoon disappears with the "progress of society" (Boas's own phrase) explains why some culture heroes, like Glooscap among the Micmac and the Penobscot, are not selfish-buffoons (Boas 1898:10). Boas sees the Raven, the trickster among many northwestern tribes, as representing a transitional point in this entire process, since Raven often benefits humankind as a favor to some personal friend (i.e., Raven acts from motives that fall somewhere between "pure" altruism and "pure" selfishness). There are at least two problems with Boas's analysis. First, it is far from obvious that a sense of altruism (which presumably refers to a willingness to put group interests ahead of self-interest) is inversely correlated with social complexity (what Boas called "the progress of society"). Second, Boas's argument leads to a very clear-cut prediction, namely that the probability of a tribe having a trickster who is both culture hero and selfish-buffoon should vary inversely with social complexity and no evidence is presented in support of this prediction. Even if we restrict ourselves to the few examples cited by Boas himself, it is not clear that his argument is supported. For instance, I can think of no reasonable measure that would allow us to say that the Penobscot and the Micmac (whose culture heroes are not selfish-buffoons) are clearly more advanced (or more altruistic) than the Haida and the Tsimshian (whose culture hero, Raven, is often a selfish-buffoon) -and yet this is exactly the way the data would have to turn out to support Boas's theory.
Ricketts (1966) has offered a more recent explanation of the trickster that is in some ways similar to Boas's. Like Boas, Ricketts argues that the trickster as culture hero and selfish-buffoon (what Ricketts calls the "trickster-fixer") is the more archaic pattern, that is, the one more likely to appear in "simpler" societies. For Ricketts, however, this is not due to the fact that such societies are somehow less altruistic, but rather to the fact that the trickster is the product of a "human being centered" religion:
We see the trickster as man fighting alone against a universe of hostile, spiritual powers-and winning-by virtue of his cleverness. The trickster is man, according to an archaic institution, struggling by himself to become what he feels he must become-master of his universe. [Ricketts 1966:336] Over the course of social evolution, Ricketts argues, as religious systems become more elaborate and begin to lose much of their human centeredness, trickster-fixers are more likely to be replaced by "pure" culture heroes who lack the physical appetites that make trickster-fixers so "human" and which lead them to behave so foolishly. In support of the contention that the trickster-fixer represents an "archaic" tradition, Ricketts (1966:328) points to the fact that "the more strongly the tribe has been influenced by the agricultural way of life, the less important is the place of the 'trickster-fixer' in the total mythology of the tribe." This is of course very similar to the inverse correlation between social complexity and the characterization of the trickster as both culture hero and selfish-buffoon at which Boas arrived.
Ricketts, unfortunately, provides no evidence whatsoever in support of his contention that there is an inverse correlation between the presence of a trickster-fixer and the "agricultural way of life." On the other hand, the latest version of Murdock's (1981) ethnographic atlas provides information relating to the practice of agriculture in 28 of the 47 tribes listed in Table 1 , and this information allows us to construct at least a partial test of the Ricketts argument.
According to the information provided by Murdock, only 9 of these 28 tribes practiced either intensive or extensive agriculture. In other words, if the tribes in Table 1 are indeed representative of the Indian tribes with trickster figures, then this data suggests that agricultural tribes were in a minority (9/28 = 32%) among such "trickster" tribes. Before relating this datum to the Ricketts argument, however, we must remember that agricultural tribes were generally in a minority in North America. In fact, out of the 124 North American tribes included in Murdock's overall sample, only 28, or 23% of the total, practiced either intensive or extensive agriculture. In other words, the proportion of "trickster" tribes which were agricultural (32% of the total) is not that much different from the proportion of all North American tribes which were agricultural (23% of the total). What this suggests is that there is no association between the presence of a trickster and the practice of agriculture, rather than the inverse correlation that Ricketts's (and Boas's) argument would lead us to expect.
Although other explanations of the Amerindian trickster have been offered over the years,' I would now like to consider--and expand upon-an explanation that I have already sketched in an earlier article (Carroll 1981) .
A FREUDIAN DILEMMA
If we approach the Amerindian trickster with a psychoanalytic eye, then the appeal of the trickster seems obvious: the trickster seeks the immediate gratification of all those sexual desires (where "sexual" refers to any activity, including sexual intercourse, excretion, and eating, that produces a diffuse sense of physical pleasure) that all of us have, but which most of us learn to inhibit as we mature. In other words, just as Freud so often saw the occurrence of incest in dreams and myths as reflecting the incestuous desires that are generated in males and females by the Oedipal process (and which are later repressed), so we can see in the trickster's elaborate attempts to copulate with a variety of women or to gorge himself a reflection of our own inhibited desires for sex and for food. This sort of argument seems perfectly able to account for the popularity of selfish-buffoons, and in fact Abrams and SuttonSmith (1977) have used a version of this argument to account for the popularity of Bugs Bunny (whom they label a trickster) among young children. But as we noted in the previous section, the Amerindian trickster is far more than a selfish-buffoon, and I can see no obvious way in which this "tricksters-reflect-our-inhibiteddesires" hypothesis can account for the two other observations that make the Amerindian tricksters so unique, namely, that they are generally culture heroes as well as buffoons, and that they are generally associated with one of four specific animal categories (raven, coyote, spider, and hare).
A much more adequate explanation of the Amerindian trickster can be had by merging the psychoanalytic perspective with the structuralism of Claude Levi-Strauss. It is a central tenet of LeviStrauss's approach to myth that one of the functions of myth is to provide a logical structure (by which Levi-Strauss simply means a chain of psychological associations) which enables the human mind to evade the perception of some unpleasant dilemma. As Leach (1974:62-63) pointed out quite some time ago, myths often fulfill this function by expressing the dilemma openly, and yet by so confusing things that the perception of the dilemma becomes difficult if not impossible. If Levi-Strauss and Leach are correct, then the first step in any attempt to explain the popularity of trickster myths would be to discover the dilemma to which these myths are addressed, and here again I think that the psychoanalytic perspective can be useful. Discontents (1975 Discontents ( [1930 ), that unless human beings inhibit their instinctual desire for sexual pleasure, orderly social life would be impossible. This conclusion flows from the observation that a group in which every member sought only the immediate gratification of his or her sexual instincts would not be able to develop the patterns of cooperation and hierarchy necessary for the maintenance of human society. All this, for instance, explains (for Freud) why the establishment of an exogamy rule is such a crucial transition in the social evolutionary history of human beings, since the establishment of this rule (which requires men to renounce sexual access to their mothers and sisters) is the first historical instance in which human beings place a social restriction on their sexual desires (Freud 1918 ).
It is a recurrent theme in Freud's work, especially in Totem and Taboo (1918) and Civilization and Its
Yet if Freud is correct, then all human beings are faced with the same dilemma, and it is this dilemma (I argue) which is addressed by the Amerindian trickster myths. Very simply, that dilemma is as follows:
1. All human beings desire BOTH the immediate gratification of their sexual impulses AND the development of civilization (in the sense of "culture"), yet 2. the Freudian reality is that both desires cannot be fulfilled simultaneously, since the immediate gratification of our sexual impulses would led to the destruction of culture.
If this dilemma does underlie the trickster myths, then it should be reflected in the psychological associations that these myths establish, and this is indeed the case.
The first part of the dilemma, namely, that all human beings desire both the immediate gratification of their sexual impulses and the smooth functioning of group life, is reflected in the very thing that makes the Amerindian trickster so distinctive, namely, that he is both a selfish-buffoon and a culture hero. In other words, by making the trickster a character who goes to great lengths to gratify enormous appetites for food and for sex and a character responsible for introducing those things that enable human society to develop, the myths are establishing a psychological association between the two things--the immediate gratification of sexual desires and "culture" -that all human beings would like to have associated.
On the other hand, the associations established by the trickster myths also reflect the "Freudian reality," that is, the fact that the uninhibited gratification of our sexual impulses would lead to the destruction of culture. To see how this is done, consider again the four animal categories associated with the Amerindian trickster: coyote, raven, hare, and spider. Is there any clearly observable characteristic which all these animals have in common? Yes: it turns out that all four types of animals are characterized by extremely solitary habits. Ravens are usually sighted singly or at most in pairs (in contrast, say, to crows which are physically similar to ravens but are very gregarious); coyotes forage independently and thus are likely to be observed singly (in contrast to wolves, which tend to hunt in packs); hares have long been noted for their solitariness (and in fact, early naturalists tended to distinguish hares and rabbits on the grounds that hares were solitary and rabbits gregarious).2
The association with solitary habits, however, is perhaps most evident in the case of spiders. Spiders generally associate with members of their own species on only two occasions: when they are born and when they mate. Apart from this, adult spiders typically spend their entire lives in isolation. There are a few species of spider who are group-living (who aggregate as adults other than to mate), but these are quite rare. One estimate (Burgess 1978:69 Tawk 'wax) rubs against a tree and is shredded by the tree's thorns. He then takes out various parts of his body (e.g. his heart, his intestines, his stomach, etc.), and these become a variety of plants which now supply food, providing human beings with sustenance. Finally, in the case of the Mataco, Tawk'wax is specifically identified as introducing human beings to (1) corn, and (2) the procedures used to cure disease (Metraux 1939 :18-19, 24) .
In other words, these Chaco trickster myths establish the same association between the "uninhibited gratification of sexual ap-petites" and the "origin of culture" that is established in North American trickster myths. The argument presented in the previous section would therefore lead us to expect that these same myths would simultaneously establish an association between "the uninhibited gratification of sexual appetites" and the "absence of culture," and that the easiest way to do this would be to associate the trickster with a solitary animal.
In the case of the Mataco trickster Tawk'wax this expectation is apparently not borne out. Tawk'wax is portrayed in Mataco mythology as a human being and, to my knowledge, no one has suggested an etymology for the name "Tawk'wax" that would allow us to associate this name with any animal category. In fact, the near perfect parallel between "Fox" stories and "Tawk'wax" stories led Metraux to try to get his Mataco informants to say that Tawk'wax was just like Fox, yet they consistently refused to do this and insisted instead that Tawk'wax was fully human (Metraux 1939 On the other hand, though possessing enormous sexual appetites, both Eshu and Legba exhibit the now familiar pattern: they are also culture heroes. Their status as culture heroes, however, rests upon a single association, namely, the association between Eshu and Legba and the system of divination practiced, respectively, by the Yoruba and the Fon, and so a brief discussion of this system of divination is necessary.
Both the Yoruba and the Fon believe that the destiny of each individual human being has been preordained by a high god, called "Olorun" by the Yoruba and "Mawu" by the Fon. It is possible, however, to use a system of divination, called Ifa by the Yoruba and Fa by the Fon, in order to learn your destiny. The prevailing ideology which underlies the system of Ifa/Fa divination is that human society will function more smoothly if human actions are "in accord" with the forces of destiny. Thus, for instance, by using Ifa/Fa, a person can learn which actions will maximize the happiness, and minimize the unhappiness, that has been pre-ordained for him or her.
That the failure to practice divination would lead to social conflicts and the destruction of human society is made evident in a number of different myths. For instance, a Fon myth (Herskovits 1967:204-205) relates how, in the period before human beings received Fa, the three kingdoms of the world (Sky, Water, and Earth, respectively) were engaged in a war that threatened to destroy humankind. The reason given for this state of affairs is very simply that humans "did not understand the language of their parent (i.e., Mawu) and, therefore, could only blunder." The myth then goes on to relate how Fa was sent to earth in order to correct this situation. The same general theme is expressed in a Yoruba myth which tells of a time when danger and chaos threatened human affairs and when Ifa was used to determine the proper sacrifice to the proper deity that would correct this situation. Once the sacrifice was made and accepted, tranquility was restored to human society:
. . . Semen became child, Men on sick bed got up, All the world became pleasant. It became powerful. Fresh crops were brought from farm Yam developed. Maize matured Rain was falling All the rivers were flooded. Everybody was happy. [Pemberton 1977:25] The implication, of course, is that if Ifa had not been used to determine the appropriate sacrifice, all these things would not have occurred.
Generally, then, the use of Ifa/Fa divination is seen as a necessary precondition for the smooth functioning of human society, and all commentators agree in saying that Ifa/Fa divination is intimately associated with Eshu/Legba. This association is established in two ways. First, both the Yoruba and the Fon have myths in which Eshu/Legba is the agent responsible for bringing Ifa/Fa to human beings (Herskovits 1967:204-205; Bascom 1969:107) . But the association is also established by the fact that Eshu/Legba is seen to be the only intermediary between human beings and the gods. Thus, it is Eshu/Legba who transmits the thoughts of Olorun/ Mawu (i.e., "destiny") to human beings in the course of Ifa/Fa, and it is Eshu/Legba who transmits the sacrifices dictated by Ifa/Fa to the various gods. This is why, for instance, most of the sacrifices dictated by Ifa/Fa are made at shrines dedicated to Eshu/Legba, and why most of the artifacts used in the course of Ifa/Fa are decorated with representations of Eshu/Legba. In summary, then, the association of Eshu/Legba with "culture" and "civilization" is insured by the strong association between Eshu/ Legba and the one thing, Ifa/Fa, that is seen as the necessary precondition for the smooth functioning of human society.
It should now be clear that these four tricksters -Anansi, Ture, Eshu, and Legba-conform to the pattern typical of North American tricksters like Coyote, Raven, Hare, etc. In each case, we have a deceiver who is simultaneously a culture hero and a person characterized by an insatiable appetite for food or sex or both. The Freudian argument developed earlier would now lead us to expect that these African tricksters will also be associated with the "absence of culture." Does this association exist?
In the case of the North and South American tricksters we have considered, this association with the "absence of culture" was established by associating these tricksters with those animals-coyotes, ravens, hares, spiders, and foxes-characterized by solitary habits. It therefore comes as no surprise to learn that "Anansi" means On the other hand, even if we adopt a relatively specific and restricted definition of the term trickster, that is, even if we apply the trickster label only to those deceivers who are simultaneously selfish-buffoons and culture heroes, then we still find that tricksters (of this sort) are widespread.
The argument put forth here has been that the key to understanding why a deceiver who is simultaneously a selfishbuffoon and a culture hero is found in the myths of so many different cultures lies in the observation that such deceivers are usually (though not always) associated with "solitary habits." Such mythic characters therefore embody a set of associations that reflect a universal human dilemma. That dilemma, very simply, is that all human beings would like to indulge their sexual appetites and have the benefits of "culture," and yet realize that such indulgence would lead to the destruction of culture.
Problems, of course, remain. My analysis, for instance, shares a defect in common with most Freudian analyses of myth, namely, that in attempting to explain the content of a set of myths by reference to psychic universals, it becomes difficult to account for cultural variation. In the case at hand, for example, I cannot easily account for the vast majority of cultures whose mythology does not involve a trickster who is both selfish-buffoon and culture hero. On the other hand, the problem of cultural variation is not insurmountable.
For instance, in making my argument, I have assumed that people everywhere will value "culture" (in the sense of "orderly human society"). Yet Edwards (1978) has made the point that for the disadvantaged groups in a society, who are regularly and systematically denied access to the benefits of "culture," the value of maintaining order in society is by no means certain. On the contrary, Edwards argues, within such disadvantaged groups, "short-term gratification" might be the most adaptive strategy, even though such a 
